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The system of health insurance and health care delivery in the
United States is very much like a patchwork quilt, one pieced together
from scraps of cloth of different shapes, sizes, patterns, and textures,
and colors.  Like the quilt, we have a patchworked array of insurance-
providing institutions in the United States, each covering a different
segment of the population, and each with its own idiosyncratic rules—
its differences in shape, size, pattern, texture, and color, if you will.
There are
• the Medicare part A and B pieces that cover those over age 65 and
the disabled under age 65;
• the Medigap pieces that provide additional coverage to the eld-
erly, beyond that available through Medicare;
• the various state Medicaid pieces covering those who are or who
have recently been on welfare, or those whose incomes are suffi-
ciently low;
• the myriad of employment-related health insurance pieces, cover-
ing many but not all employees, along with their spouses and
dependents;
• the employment-based retiree health insurance pieces, covering
the former employees of companies, those who have since
retired; and
• the pieces that cover students attending various universities
throughout the country and elsewhere.
And then there is the backdrop, the part of the quilt that generally goes
unnoticed: the uninsured individuals who are not covered by any of the
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other insurance pieces and who must pay for their medical expendi-
tures out of pocket or receive uncompensated care.  
The analogy can only be taken so far, however.  The patchwork
quilt evokes images of warmth, love, home and hearth, hot cocoa, a
crackling fire at a cabin in the woods.  In contrast, the patchwork U.S.
health insurance system is more likely to evoke images of frustration,
hassle, red tape, paperwork, and annoying voice-automated telephone
response systems.  The patchwork quilt is not a perfect metaphor, but it
is a good one.
There are many important economic implications associated with
the fragmented, patchwork system of health insurance coverage that
we have in the United States.  This chapter focuses on one of these eco-
nomic implications, namely, the relationship between the various insti-
tutions that provide health insurance in the United States, and the labor
market decisions made by individuals and employers.  More than two-
thirds of the gross domestic product in the United States is derived
from the labor market—the labor services of individuals employed in
producing goods and services in the economy.  Distortions in the effi-
cient operation of the labor market can thus have a tremendous effect
not only on the welfare of specific individuals, but on the economy as a
whole.
But what is the link between health insurance and the labor mar-
ket?  Why is this even a concern?  The link derives from the character-
istics of the pieces in the patchwork quilt.  Many of the insurance-
providing institutions in the United States, the pieces of the patchwork
quilt, have some connection, either directly or indirectly, to the
employment status of individuals.   The idiosyncratic relationships
between the labor market and the types of health insurance coverage
that are available to individuals affects the labor market behavior of
both individuals and firms in some very interesting and economically
important ways.
Before analyzing the labor market effects of health insurance in the
United States, it is important to more closely examine the pieces of the
quilt—the various health insurance institutions—and how they are tied
to the labor market.
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HEALTH INSURANCE INSTITUTIONS
IN THE UNITED STATES
By far the most significant piece of the quilt, at least in terms of
magnitude, is employer-provided health insurance coverage.  This
employee benefit provides health insurance to 64 percent of the non-
elderly U.S. population.  Some of these individuals, about half, receive
this coverage by virtue of their own employment, while the rest receive
it as dependents of a spouse or parent who works.  In addition, some
employers provide so-called “retiree” health insurance to former
employees who have retired.  About 45 percent of the elderly have this
type of health insurance from a previous employer.
It is interesting to consider why the United States, in contrast to
most other developed countries, has a health insurance system in which
employers are the primary providers of insurance rather than the gov-
ernment, at least for the non-elderly, and also why employers are the
primary providers of health insurance but not other types of insurance.
The United States has repeatedly rejected broad attempts to “socialize”
either medical care or health insurance provision.  The first such initia-
tive, during the 1930s, failed despite the concurrent genesis of so many
other New Deal government social programs.  The most recent initia-
tive was the failed Clinton administration attempt at national health
reform.  And there have been other similarly doomed attempts in the
interim.  In the absence of universal government-provided health insur-
ance coverage, market forces have pushed employers into their role as
primary providers of insurance.  These market forces include  
• a substantial price advantage given to employers through the tax
code because firm health insurance expenditures on behalf of
their employees are not counted as taxable income to either the
firm or the employees,
• economies of scale that derive from providing health insurance to
a large group of individuals, and 
• the effectiveness of the workplace as a pooling mechanism to
overcome the problems of adverse selection that plague some
individual insurance markets, especially the individual market for
health insurance.
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As an institution, employer-provided health was really established dur-
ing the two decades following World War II, although there are some
limited examples of employers providing such coverage before the war.
The second, third, and fourth pieces of the quilt are various types
of government-sponsored health insurance: Medicare, Medicaid, and
CHAMPUS.  It is interesting that even at the governmental level, there
is no single unified health insurance program.  By far the largest gov-
ernment health insurance program is Medicare.  Medicare was imple-
mented in 1965 to provide health insurance coverage to the elderly,
individuals aged 65 and over, many of whom were left uninsured or
underinsured upon their retirement when coverage through their
former employers ceased.  Medicare also covers some individuals
under age 65, specifically those who are disabled and eligible for
Social Security Disability Insurance.  Currently, Medicare covers over
96 percent of those over age 65, and 5 percent of those under age 65.
The third piece of the quilt, Medicaid, is a state-run program
funded jointly by the state and federal governments.  This program was
traditionally a health insurance program for welfare recipients, prima-
rily single mothers and their children, and also for the low-income eld-
erly.  In recent years it has been expanded to provide coverage to non-
welfare-eligible families with modest incomes, particularly children.
There is great heterogeneity among states in the eligibility require-
ments for Medicaid, and in the benefits that are actually provided—yet
another example of the fragmented, patchwork nature of U.S. health
insurance.  Overall, 9 percent of the elderly are covered by Medicaid,
as are 11 percent of the non-elderly.
The fourth governmentally provided piece of the quilt is CHAM-
PUS/VA, the program that provides health insurance to members of the
uniformed services and their families, and to veterans.  About 3 percent
of the population is covered by this type of health insurance, a fraction
that has been falling steadily for years as the number of those in active
military service declines because of military cutbacks, and as the num-
ber of veterans declines.
The final piece of the patchwork quilt is a bit of a catchall—other
private insurance.  This category encompasses a broad array of in-
stitutions ranging from supplemental Medigap coverage for the elderly,
to university-provided health insurance for students, to individually
purchased policies from traditional insurers such as Blue Cross/Blue
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Shield, to health insurance provided through membership
organizations such as a credit union or a trade or professional
association.  Together, these various types of other private insurance
cover about 7 percent of the non-elderly population, and perhaps as
much as one-third of the elderly population.
Then, of course, there are the uninsured, those who do not have
health insurance through their own or a family member’s employment,
who are not old enough or disabled enough to qualify for Medicare,
who are not eligible or decline to participate in Medicaid or CHAM-
PUS/VA, and who either cannot afford or choose not to purchase health
insurance in the private market.  These 43 million individuals represent
about 18 percent of the non-elderly population.  Due in large part to
Medicare, only a small fraction of the elderly, about 1 percent, are
uninsured.
With this brief introduction to the various “pieces” of the insurance
quilt, let us now turn to how this patchwork array of insurance institu-
tions affects the labor market decisions made by individuals and firms.
HEALTH INSURANCE AND RETIREMENT
Perhaps the most important labor market outcome to consider is
employment itself—how does health insurance affect individual partic-
ipation in the labor market?  It affects participation because certain
types of health insurance are provided as a condition of employment
(for example, employer-provided health insurance), while other types
of health insurance are more readily available when individuals are not
employed, or not fully employed (for example, Medicaid or university-
sponsored student health insurance), while still others are available
regardless of employment status (for example, Medicare for those over
age 65).
With respect to the effects of health insurance, the most widely
studied facet of labor force participation that has been examined is
retirement.  To what extent does health insurance determine when and
how individuals choose to withdraw from the labor force?  The answer
lies in the interaction between three different pieces of the patchwork
quilt: employer-provided health insurance for active employees,
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employer-provided retiree health insurance, and Medicare.  As already
noted, many but not all employers provide health insurance to their
employees and to their spouses and dependents.  This insurance, how-
ever, is usually conditional on employment; employees who cease to
work usually find that their health insurance coverage ceases as well.
Some companies, however, offer retiree health insurance.  About one-
third of employers continue to provide health insurance to some or all
of their former employees who have retired.  For individuals who work
at these companies and who are eligible for retiree health insurance,
retirement does not imply a loss of health insurance coverage.  And
once individuals reach age 65, even the absence of retiree health insur-
ance does not imply a loss of health insurance coverage upon retire-
ment, because virtually everyone aged 65 and older is eligible for
Medicare.
The interactions between these three different types of health
insurance provide several venues through which health insurance can
affect the retirement behavior of older individuals.  For example, some
individuals work in firms that provide retiree health insurance while
others do not.  For individuals who are younger than 65 and not yet eli-
gible for Medicare, a lack of retiree health insurance should serve as a
deterrent to retirement, at least until individuals reach the age of 65.
Several studies have found consistent evidence that individuals whose
employers provide retiree health insurance leave the labor force earlier
than individuals whose employers do not (Madrian 1994a; Karoly and
Rogowski 1994; Gustman and Steinmeier 1994; Rust and Phelan 1997;
Blau and Gilleskie 1997; and Rogowski and Karoly 2000).  My own
research suggests that individuals with access to retiree health insur-
ance leave the labor market between 6 and 18 months earlier than indi-
viduals who do not have access to retiree health insurance (Madrian
1994a).  These individuals are also much more likely to retire before
the age of 65.  Evidence along these lines but of a more anecdotal
nature also comes from a recent Gallup poll in which “61 percent of
workers reported that they would not retire before becoming eligible
for Medicare if their employer did not provide retiree health benefits.”
(Employee Benefit Research Institute 1993).
The key thing that generates the relationship between health insur-
ance and retirement just described is that retiree health insurance
essentially makes employer-provided health insurance portable across
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the transition from work to retirement.  Individuals with other types of
portable or quasi-portable health insurance should also be more likely
to retire, at least before the age of 65, than individuals without portable
health insurance.  Another institution that makes employer-provided
health insurance at least somewhat portable is COBRA, a federal law
that took effect in 1986 that requires employers to allow former
employees to buy into their former employers’ health insurance plan
for up to 18 months.  In terms of motivating retirement, COBRA is not
as generous as retiree health insurance for two reasons: it is of only
limited duration while retiree health insurance is not, and it requires
much greater out-of-pocket payments than does retiree health insur-
ance.  Nevertheless, there is also evidence that the limited health insur-
ance portability instituted through COBRA increased retirement rates
for those under age 65 by almost 30 percent (Gruber and Madrian
1995).
Individuals who are covered by non-employment-based health
insurance (for example, through Medicaid or policies purchased indi-
vidually in the private market) also have a type of health insurance cov-
erage that is portable across the transition from work to retirement.
Once again, empirical evidence suggests that these individuals are also
more likely to retire than are individuals with employer-provided
health insurance that would be lost upon retirement, at least before the
age of 65 (Rust and Phelan 1997).
An interesting thing happens at age 65 when individuals become
eligible for Medicare: even for those individuals with employer-pro-
vided health insurance that does not continue into retirement, leaving
the labor force no longer implies a loss of health insurance because
individuals are covered by Medicare.  Thus, Medicare eligibility
should provide a strong retirement incentive for those individuals not
eligible for retiree health insurance.  And indeed, a substantial fraction
of 64-year-olds do retire at age 65 when they become eligible for
Medicare.  Empirical research has to date been unable to precisely
quantify the magnitude of this Medicare-induced retirement effect
because age 65 also happens to be the normal age to qualify for Social
Security and the age at which many pension plans provide full retire-
ment benefits.  With so many other factors motivating retirement that
are coincident with Medicare eligibility, it is difficult to quantify
exactly how big each of the respective effects are.  But the evidence on
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how other types of health insurance affect retirement suggests that
Medicare eligibility should be very important as well.
One idiosyncratic feature of Medicare, which, like other types of
health insurance, also generates interesting variations in retirement
behavior, is that Medicare only covers individuals and not spouses or
dependent children.  As a result, the retirement decisions of two indi-
viduals without retiree health insurance who are both about to turn 65,
one with a spouse who is younger and the other with a spouse who is
older, could be quite different.  For the individual with the older
spouse, retirement at the age of Medicare eligibility will result in a loss
of health insurance coverage for neither spouse—both will be covered
by Medicare.  Indeed, the older spouse already is.  In contrast, retire-
ment at the age of Medicare eligibility for the individual with a
younger spouse will result in a loss of health insurance coverage for the
spouse if the spouse was covered as a dependent on the employee’s
plan and not through his or her own independent coverage.  Interest-
ingly, men with younger wives are less likely to retire than are men
with older wives until their spouses also become eligible for Medicare
(Madrian and Beaulieu 1998).  Thus, retirement is affected not only by
one’s own Medicare eligibility, but also by the Medicare eligibility of
one’s spouse.
Health insurance also affects the nature of the transition from work
to retirement.  Some individuals move from full-time work to full-time
retirement, while others pursue a more gradual transition from work to
retirement, moving from full-time work to part-time work, and then
eventually to full-time retirement.  Because employer-provided health
insurance is typically contingent upon full-time employment, it is usu-
ally difficult to maintain employer-provided health insurance while
working part-time.  Individuals with retiree health insurance, however,
can retire from their full-time jobs and move to a different part-time or
self-employment job while maintaining health insurance through their
former employers.  Research has shown that individuals with retiree
health insurance are indeed much more likely to make a gradual transi-
tion from work to retirement than are individuals without retiree health
insurance.  Interestingly, many older workers, when asked, express a
desire to make a gradual transition from work to retirement.  Thus,
health insurance that is portable across the transition from work to
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retirement appears to be an institution that enables individuals to retire
both when and how they desire (Rust and Phelan 1997).
Understanding how health insurance affects retirement incentives
is a particularly important policy issue because the retirement decisions
of older individuals could be affected quite substantially in the upcom-
ing years by changes in the institutions that provide health insurance to
retirees—a resizing of the pieces in the patchwork quilt, if you will.
The first important change is a dramatic decline in the number of
employers that offer retiree health insurance.  The fraction of employ-
ers offering retiree health insurance has fallen by almost half over the
past 15 years, in large part because the escalation in medical care costs
has made retiree health insurance an incredibly expensive benefit to
provide.  This erosion in the availability of retiree health insurance cov-
erage will make retirement before the age of 65 much more difficult for
many workers.  Based on the evidence in the research that I have sum-
marized so far, there will likely be an eventual increase in the average
retirement age if the availability of retiree health insurance were the
only factor affecting retirement that continued to change.  While there
has been no research to date explicitly focused on the decline in the
availability of retiree health insurance and its effect on retirement, it is
interesting to note that the decades-long trend in the declining average
retirement age of men ended in 1985, at about the same time that
employers began to drop their retiree health insurance plans.
A second potential major change in the health insurance landscape
for older workers is the prospect of Medicare reform.  There is almost
universal consensus in both academic and policy circles that, for any
number of reasons, Medicare needs to be reformed.  Unfortunately,
disagreement on exactly how it should be reformed has resulted in leg-
islative paralysis.  There have, however, been numerous proposals to
reform Medicare, each of which would affect the labor force participa-
tion decisions of older workers in different ways.  For example, the
Breaux-Thomas proposal that came out of the recently disbanded
Medicare reform commission would have raised the Medicare eligibil-
ity age to conform with the scheduled increase in the Social Security
normal retirement age from 65 to 67.  This change would delay retire-
ment for those individuals without access to retiree health insurance, a
group which, as just noted, is increasing in size as employers opt out of
the retiree health insurance business.  In addition, increasing the age of
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Medicare eligibility would increase the cost to employers of providing
retiree health insurance, and would likely provide even greater incen-
tives for employers to relinquish their retiree health insurance plans.
Thus, increasing the age of Medicare eligibility is likely to lead to
increases in the average retirement age, both directly through the effect
on retirement incentives of individuals without retiree health insurance,
and indirectly through the incentive it creates for employers to abandon
their retiree health insurance plans.
President Clinton presented a different Medicare reform proposal
that would allow all individuals between the ages of 62 and 64 to buy
into the Medicare program.  By making Medicare available earlier,
even though at a nonsubsidized price, this type of reform would actu-
ally motivate retirement at younger ages, reinforcing the decades-long
trend toward earlier retirement.
Whether the current average retirement age is too high, too low, or
just right is a normative question that perhaps warrants an entire chap-
ter of its own.  The point is that the health insurance landscape for older
workers is currently changing in a very important way as employers
give up their retiree health insurance plans, and it is likely to change
even further as Congress will eventually make reforms to the Medicare
program.  These changes will certainly affect not only the retirement
decisions of older workers, but also the savings and consumption deci-
sions of younger workers as they make future plans for retirement.  The
overall economic implications of these changes could be tremendous.
HEALTH INSURANCE AND LABOR 
FORCE PARTICIPATION
While much of the research on how health insurance affects labor
force participation has been directed at the issue of retirement, older
individuals are not the only ones whose employment decisions are
affected by health insurance.  Because the vast majority of prime-aged
men work regardless of whether they receive employer-provided health
insurance, it is women whose labor force participation decisions are
most likely to be influenced by the availability of health insurance.
One specific group of women for whom health insurance is likely to be
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particularly important are unskilled, less-educated, single mothers.  As
parents, they are apt to have a higher demand for health insurance cov-
erage than single women without children.  But, as single parents, they
do not have access to health insurance coverage through their spouses.
And, as unskilled single parents, they are qualified primarily for low-
wage jobs—jobs that are much less likely to come with health insur-
ance.  One source of health insurance coverage that is potentially avail-
able to these women is Medicaid.  However, until recently, welfare
participation was a virtual precondition for the receipt of Medicaid
benefits: employment that generated income sufficient to disqualify an
individual from receiving further welfare benefits also disqualified an
individual from further receipt of Medicaid.  Thus, many less-skilled
female workers have faced a choice between not working or working
part time and receiving Medicaid, or working full time and losing both
welfare benefits and Medicaid coverage.
An interesting change in the Medicaid eligibility rules in the late
1980s and early 1990s has made it possible to disentangle the impact of
Medicaid eligibility on labor force participation from that of general
welfare eligibility.  A series of federal and state legislative initiatives
have allowed women to maintain their Medicaid coverage for a pre-
specified period of time after leaving welfare and extended indefinitely
Medicaid coverage to many groups of low-income children.  These
changes effectively make Medicaid portable across the transition from
welfare to work for a finite period for welfare recipients themselves,
and for a much longer period for their children.  Empirical research
suggests that this type of Medicaid portability increases both the labor
force participation and the hours worked of low-income single mothers
(Yelowitz 1995).  The former link between Medicaid and welfare par-
ticipation was, in fact, a deterrent in motivating welfare recipients to
find full-time work.
Married women are another group whose labor force participation
is likely to be influenced by the availability of health insurance cover-
age.  As already noted, prime-aged men are likely to work regardless of
the availability of health insurance.  In contrast, married women’s labor
supply has historically tended to be much more sensitive to the finan-
cial incentives associated with work, one of which is health insurance.
Because most companies that offer health insurance make it available
to both employees and their spouses, many married women receive
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health insurance coverage through their husbands.  Whether or not a
married woman has health insurance through her spouse turns out to be
a very important factor in whether and how much she works.  Married
women with health insurance through their husbands are substantially
less likely to work than are women without health insurance from their
spouses.  And those who do work are much more likely to be employed
in part-time rather than full-time jobs—jobs that typically do not pro-
vide health insurance (Buchmueller and Valetta 1999; Olson 1998).
Thus, for married women, the lack of health insurance from a spouse’s
employment seems to have a strong influence in motivating married
women to find jobs with health insurance themselves.
A recent study of married women’s labor supply in Spain uncov-
ered another interesting link between health insurance finance and
female labor supply.  In Spain, health care is provided by the govern-
ment and financed out of a mandatory payroll tax paid partially by the
firm and partially by the employee.  Payment of the payroll tax entitles
workers, their spouses, and dependent children to health care, as well
as to a pension and sick leave.  Among men, compliance with the pay-
roll tax is universal.  Among married women, however, over one-quar-
ter of those who are employed work in the “underground” economy
where “required” taxes are not paid (de la Rica and Lemieux 1994).  
There are many other less-studied avenues through which health
insurance is likely to affect labor supply.  There is some evidence that
the availability of health insurance during times of unemployment
affects both the likelihood of and the duration of an unemployment
spell (Gruber and Madrian 1997).  The link between Medicare cover-
age and the receipt of Social Security Disability Insurance for disabled
individuals under the age of 65 could act as a deterrent for work among
the disabled, or at least work that would be sufficient to disqualify them
from further disability benefits and the Medicare coverage that accom-
panies these benefits.  University-provided health insurance to students
operates in a similar way; individuals can participate in student health
plans if they maintain their student status, which typically involves reg-
istering for a certain number of credit hours and maintaining satisfac-
tory grades.  Employment, or at least full-time employment, may
jeopardize an individual’s ability to maintain status as a student.  Thus,
some students who value their health insurance may be deterred from
entering the labor market. 
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HEALTH INSURANCE AND JOB TURNOVER
Health insurance also affects the types of jobs in which individuals
are employed.  I have already noted that health insurance affects not
only labor force participation, but also the choice of full- or part-time
work for older individuals contemplating retirement, for married
women, and for single women on welfare.  Beyond the full- or part-
time dimension of job choice, health insurance also influences the
choice between various full-time jobs for those who want to work full-
time—not only the initial choice of where to work, but also subsequent
decisions about whether or not to change jobs.  Economists are inter-
ested in the issue of job turnover because it is the process by which
workers are reallocated away from jobs where they are less productive
and into jobs where they are more productive.  Impediments to produc-
tivity-enhancing job turnover are thus a barrier to economic growth.
To make this point in a rather extreme way, imagine how different your
life and the whole economy would be if your first employer were also
your only employer; that is, if you could never change jobs.
Why does health insurance influence job turnover?  One obvious
reason is that not all employers offer health insurance.  Individuals who
have employer-provided health insurance and place a high value on it
will be reluctant to switch to a company that doesn’t provide health
insurance.  On the flip side, individuals who don’t have employer-pro-
vided health insurance and who place a high value on it will be trying
to switch to companies that do provide health insurance.  An interest-
ing piece of evidence on this front comes from the behavior of married
men who are working in jobs without health insurance.  Married men
without health insurance but who have pregnant wives are twice as
likely to change jobs as married men without health insurance whose
wives are not pregnant (Madrian 1994b).  The impending birth of a
child clearly increases the value of health insurance, and these men
respond by changing jobs, presumably in an attempt to find work with
health insurance.
A second reason that health insurance affects the job turnover deci-
sions of individuals is that not all employer-provided health insurance
plans are equal, at least not for an employee who contemplates chang-
ing jobs.  In addition to variation among employers in the generosity of
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the health insurance package in terms of co-payments, deductibles, and
what is covered, there are two more subtle issues to consider.  The first
is that many employers exclude preexisting conditions for a certain
period of time.  So, even though a new employer and one’s current
employer may appear to provide identical coverage, the coverage of the
new employer may in fact be vastly inferior for families with medical
problems if these problems are not covered under the terms of a preex-
isting conditions exclusion restriction.  The second issue is that in the
era of managed care, employees do not generally have free choice
among medical providers.  Thus, an employment change that is accom-
panied by a health insurance change is also likely to necessitate a med-
ical provider change.  Individuals who value relationships with their
current doctors may thus be averse to changing health insurance plans
even if preexisting conditions are not an issue.
My own research on the relationship between health insurance and
job turnover and that of others confirms that health insurance is an
important factor in the decision to change jobs.  One interesting finding
is that among individuals who have employer-provided health insur-
ance, those who also have coverage through the employment of a
spouse are much more likely to change jobs than those who do not
(Madrian 1994b; Buchmueller and Valetta 1996).  In essence, health
insurance coverage through a spouse’s employment is portable across
the transition from one job to another and is one way to skirt the preex-
isting conditions exclusions that may be in place at a new employer.
Another interesting finding is that COBRA, in addition to motivating
retirement among older workers, also motivates job turnover among
younger workers (Gruber and Madrian 1994).  COBRA makes the
health insurance from one’s former employer portable across jobs, at
least for a limited time, but apparently long enough for many to skirt
preexisting conditions exclusions.
One particular type of job transition, the movement to self-employ-
ment, is also likely to be influenced by the availability of health insur-
ance.  The self-employed owners of firms do not generally get the same
tax advantages from purchasing health insurance as do employees.
Moreover, because most of the self-employed tend to be sole propri-
etors or have very small firms, they are not able to take advantage of
the economies of scale in health insurance provision available to large
firms, or the benefits that large firms have in reducing the negative
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impact of adverse selection on the costs of insuring their employees.
Thus, the health insurance costs of becoming self-employed may be
nontrivial.  Some research suggests that health insurance is indeed a
factor in the decision about whether or not to become self-employed,
and that individuals for whom the loss of health insurance is less costly
(for example, those with health insurance through a spouse) are more
likely to switch from employment to self-employment (Madrian and
Lefgren 1998).
The likelihood of a future layoff—involuntary job turnover—may
also affect the job choice decisions of individuals who place a high
value on health insurance.  Several years ago I had an MBA student
who had been recently diagnosed with multiple sclerosis, a condition
that would almost surely be classified as a preexisting condition.  Upon
hearing about my research interests, he told me that although he really
wanted to work for a consulting firm and had indeed received offers to
do so, he had decided to accept a job with a large manufacturing com-
pany with essentially a policy of lifetime employment.  He reasoned
that consulting companies have a reputation for promoting only a very
small fraction of their hires to partner; the rest either leave or are dis-
missed within the first few years.  Given his medical situation, he felt
that it would be imprudent to accept a job in which there would be
uncertainty regarding his future health insurance coverage as a result of
the inherent uncertainty in the long-term job prospects at a consulting
firm.
HEALTH INSURANCE AND 
THE EMPLOYMENT DECISIONS OF FIRMS
It is also interesting to consider the relationship between health
insurance and job turnover from the employer’s perspective.  For an
employer who offers health insurance coverage, sick employees (or
healthy employees with sick dependents) are costly in two ways: they
may be less productive and they are likely to generate higher insurance
claims.  Because of their medical expenditures, these employees may
be relatively more attractive targets for layoffs.  The link between
health insurance and employment may thus have an adverse effect on
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families with medical problems if these problems lead to claims-based
layoffs.  Although I have seen no formal analysis of the prevalence of
this type of layoff behavior, there is certainly anecdotal evidence that it
does occur.
In addition to its effect on the employment and job choice deci-
sions of individuals, health insurance may also influence the labor
demand decisions of employers.  There are two features of health
insurance provision that are particularly salient in this regard.  The first
is that health insurance is a fixed cost of employment.  Expected
employer expenditures on health insurance do not increase when the
weekly hours worked by their employees increase, and they do not
increase when compensation increases; they only increase when more
employees are hired.  This feature of health insurance, its fixed-cost
nature, gives firms an incentive to economize on the costs of providing
health insurance in two ways: by hiring fewer employees but at longer
weekly hours, which is one way to maintain production while reducing
the overall costs of providing health insurance, and by hiring fewer but
more productive employees—employees who can produce more than
the average employee would.  Some of my own research done in con-
junction with David Cutler provides partial evidence that firms have
substituted longer weekly hours for fewer workers as health insurance
costs have increased over recent years.  Moreover, the effects are non-
trivial.  The increase in weekly hours associated with the increase in
health insurance costs between 1980 and 1993 resulted in a change in
average weekly hours among those with health insurance equivalent to
roughly half the change in labor input that is observed in a typical
recession (Cutler and Madrian 1999).
Anecdotally, there have been several strikes in recent years against
companies such as General Motors over the issue of perceived excess
overtime.  Companies have scheduled their workers for overtime on a
regular basis, sometimes as many as 20 hours per week, in order to
avoid the health insurance and other fixed costs of employment associ-
ated with hiring new workers.  The workers, preferring shorter hours to
an overtime premium, have gone on strike in an effort to pressure the
companies into hiring more workers.
The second feature of health insurance that is salient to the labor
demand decision is the distinction between full- and part-time workers
in the tax treatment of employer expenditures on health insurance.  As
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already noted briefly, employer expenditures on health insurance are
usually not subject to taxation; however, there is one caveat: employers
must satisfy a set of IRS nondiscrimination rules which stipulate that if
a firm is to provide health insurance, it must make it widely available to
nearly all employees.  In essence, employers cannot selectively decide
that they will provide health insurance to some employees and not to
others, either because of favoritism or as a cost-saving measure.  How-
ever, certain groups of employees, namely part-time, temporary, and
seasonal workers, are exempt from the requirements of the nondiscrim-
ination rules.  Thus, employers can deny health insurance coverage to
part-time, temporary, and seasonal workers while still obtaining favor-
able tax treatment for their health insurance expenditures on full-time
permanent employees.  As health insurance becomes more expensive
to provide, the nondiscrimination rules give employers an incentive to
hire part-time and temporary workers in lieu of full-time workers as a
way to economize on insurance expenditures.  While there are many
reasons behind the phenomenal growth in the temporary help industry
over the past two decades, the increasing cost of providing health
insurance is surely one of them.
More concrete evidence that employers substitute part-timers for
full-timers in the face of higher health insurance costs comes from the
state of Hawaii.  In 1974, Hawaii mandated employer provision of
health insurance to full-time but not part-time workers.  Those indus-
tries most affected by the mandate, namely industries in which rela-
tively few full-time workers were covered by health insurance initially,
saw a large increase in the fraction of workers employed in part-time
jobs following the mandate.  Essentially, employers who were sud-
denly faced with large health insurance bills as a result of the mandate
decided to substitute part-time workers for full-time workers as a way
to skirt requirement of the new law.  In contrast, industries in which
almost all full-time employees were already receiving health insurance
saw little shift in the fraction of full- versus part-time workers (Thur-
ston 1997).
For firms, then, health insurance affects both the size and composi-
tion of the workforce that is employed.  As health insurance becomes
more costly to provide, employers have an incentive to reduce their
health insurance costs by substituting overtime for employment, skilled
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labor for unskilled labor, and part-time and temporary workers for reg-
ular full-time employees.
CONCLUSION
There is an important relationship between labor market outcomes
and the institutions and rules governing health insurance provision in
the United States.  Health insurance is an important factor in almost
every labor market decision made by individuals: whether to work,
where to work, how many hours to work, and so on.  It is also an
important factor in the human resource decisions made by employers:
how many workers to hire, whom to hire, how to structure the terms
and conditions of employment.
But, given that there are many factors that affect the labor market
decisions of individuals and firms, why the special concern with health
insurance?  Because our health care system continues to evolve in ways
that influence important labor market outcomes.  Significant changes in
the health insurance institutions of the United States have taken place
over the past 15 years.  These include
• the implementation of COBRA, which provides limited health
insurance portability to workers covered by employer-provided
health insurance, 
• passage of HIPAA, which attempts to further increase the amount
of health insurance portability in the economy, 
• the extension of Medicaid benefits to pregnant women and low-
income children regardless of parental participation in either state
welfare programs or the labor market, 
• the shift away from fee-for-service medicine and toward managed
care,
• the tax deductibility of health insurance expenditures of the self-
employed, 
• small business health insurance pools, 
• a dramatic decline in employer provision of retiree health insur-
ance, and
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• a proliferation in state-mandated health insurance benefits.
And even more substantive changes continue to be proposed, such as
• changes in the Medicare eligibility age, 
• changes in or elimination of the tax-deductibility of health insur-
ance and other employee benefits, 
• mandatory community rating of health premiums insurance in the
nongroup market,
• further expansions in the availability of publicly provided health
insurance, and, of course, 
• broad-based national health care reform, an issue that is not
widely discussed at the moment but, if history is our guide, will
surely resurface at some point in the future.
The merits of these various proposals depend on a variety of
things.  While most discussion tends to focus on access to health care
services and the government budget, it is also important to consider the
impact of these proposals on the labor market.  Do they promote or
impede labor market efficiency?  Do they distort the labor supply
choices that individuals otherwise would have made?  Do they change
the hiring decisions of firms?
These issues are perhaps most important not in the United States,
but in the developing countries of the world that are currently strug-
gling to design and implement their own health care and health insur-
ance institutions.  An important lesson to be learned from the
experience of the United States is that while employer provision of
health insurance is a convenient way to finance insurance benefits with-
out involving the government budget directly, not everyone is tied to
the labor market.  Reliance on and encouragement of employer provi-
sion of health insurance will invariably result in government programs
to fill in the gaps and cover the otherwise uninsured.  But it is the inter-
play between these various institutions, some tied directly to the labor
market and others not, that results in distortions of the labor market
decisions of individuals and firms.
Is there a way to eliminate the labor market distortions associated
with health insurance provision in the United States?  Yes and no; one
way would be to have nationalized health insurance that covered every-
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one regardless of employment status.  Such an institution would pro-
vide no incentives to be employed or not employed, at least not on the
basis of health insurance.  However, such an institution would invari-
ably involve distortions along other margins.  For example, the tax rev-
enue needed to finance nationalized health insurance would invariably
create distortions in the markets that are taxed, quite possibly the labor
market if financed through an income or payroll tax.  This would, in
essence, involve trading one set of labor market distortions for another.
It’s a gloomy picture, isn’t it?
The bottom line, then, is that any system of health insurance provi-
sion is likely to involve labor market distortions, either directly through
the institutions themselves, or indirectly through the way they are
financed.  This is not necessarily bad—after all, many of the good
things that are provided by the government involve trading one kind of
market distortion for another: public education, roads and other forms
of infrastructure, and national defense.  By understanding the distor-
tions, i.e., where they come from and how big they are, we can begin to
make informed decisions about which types of reform will have the
greatest beneficial impact on both health and economic efficiency.
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